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Legal Relation of Trauma to Cancer
Isidore Halpern*
W HJEEN A LAWYER ATTEMPTS to discuss the subject of cancer,VYhe finds himself in the position of the nursery rhyme
figures, Winken, Blinken and Nod, who attempted to sail a
stormy, turbulent sea in a frail washtub. How does the lawyer
feel with respect to the medical questions presented by the prob-
lem of relation of an isolated trauma to cancer? My legal col-
leagues disagree violently amongst themselves.
I approach the entire subject with humility. After all, am
I not in the position of one who has a knowledge of elementary
algebra and is asked to express an opinion on the subject of cal-
culus? I am mindful of the statements of Dr. Lelia Charlton
Knox who said:
it is obvious that the science of tumors is still in the course
of development. . . So much new knowledge has been
acquired from the studies of tumors in human beings and in
animals in the last twenty years, that many observations
which were regarded as established facts by the preceding
generation, have now been, of necessity, discarded or com-
pletely remolded... Writers on the subject of the relation-
ship between a single trauma and the appearance of a neo-
plasm, still cite the works of the old masters with a highly
commendable desire for accuracy and completeness; but that
these citations have any great value in comparison with
what we now know, is more than doubtful.'
The writer, in this manner, disposes of the opinion of the
great Virchow, stating that he might have changed his opinion
with respect to trauma and cancer if he had before him the past
twenty years of biological research on the nature and causation
of tumors. She does, however, state that a single trauma has
never been proved to be the cause of animal tumor.
As far as the writer's personal opinion is concerned, he has
lectured and taught to thousands of lawyers that one trauma will
* Of Brooklyn, New York; member of the New York Bar; Fellow of the
American College of Trial Lawyers and of the International Academy of
Trial Lawyers, Chairman of the Advanced Medical Course at the Practic-
ing Law Institute of New York; Advisory Board of Editors of Negligence &
Compensation Service; etc.
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cer in Workmen's Compensation, 11 Clev-Mar. L. R. 501 (1962).
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never cause a cancer. This opinion is based on the experimental
work done by Maude Slye, Ribbert, and Lubarsch. 2 However,
one must be mindful of the opinion of Dr. Ropke, who states that
11.3 of cancers of the skin are caused by a single injury.3 The
experimentor, Borrmann, places it at scarcely 1%.4 Despite the
so-called Ewing Postulates,5 Lubarsch views the time interval as
unimportant for the reason that nothing is known concerning the
time required by the cells to grow into a tumor which can be
recognized.6
As a practical lawyer, my negative viewpoint is based on
the statistics compiled from the many thousands of serious in-
juries sustained in the various World Wars. It is likewise based
on the opinion of Dr. Lewy, Chief Medical Examiner of the Bu-
reau of Workmen's Compensation, Department of Labor of the
State of New York. After examining 26,389 cases, he was of the
opinion that trauma, per se, is never the primary cause for the
development of any type of cancer.7 To similar effect, the state-
ment of Dr. Pick in connection with the injuries sustained by
German soldiers, and likewise the studies of the French Associa-
tion for the study of cancer in 1918.8 It may be noted, however,
that Dr. Berard disagreed and held the position that trauma was
quite frequently the cause of neoplasm.9
Space does not permit a recitation of the authorities on the
subject of trauma and the aggravation of cancer. To repeat, as a
practical lawyer, I have grave doubts, with the exception of
osteogenetic sarcomas in the region of the epiphysis in children,
as to the possibility of a single trauma causing cancer.
Let me now, however, review a subject concerning which
there can be no doubt. What views have our courts taken with
respect to trauma and cancer? They have followed the so-
called Ewing's Postulates enunciated in 1935. Dr. Ewing's five
2 Id. at 481-488.
3 Id. at 481.
4 Ibid.
5 Ewing, Neoplastic Diseases 108 (4th ed. 1940).
6 Knox, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 483.
7 New York State Department of Labor Med. Bull., Nos. 1 and 3 (1923).
8 Pick, Traumatic Genesis of Sarcomas, 17 Med. Klin. 406 (1921).
9 Knox, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 495.
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postulates for proving causal relations between trauma and
cancer are: 0
(1) Previous integrity of the wounded part,
(2) Nature and authenticity of the trauma,
(3) Adequacy or severity of the trauma,
(4) Diagnosis of the cancer,
(5) Origin of the cancer at the place of inquiry,
(6) Reasonable time relation between the date of the
trauma and the appearance of the cancer, and
(7) Character or structure of the resulting growth.
There are many cases on the books, and time does not per-
mit a discussion of all of them. The most significant one is the
case of Dennison v. Wing."' It was the plaintiff's claim that she
had a fracture of the left clavicle and a contusion of the left
shoulder and upper chest. There was no original breast in-
jury. Four weeks later, it was claimed that there was a swelling
over the clavicle with tenderness and discoloration extending
down from the clavicle to the upper chest. Approximately two
months after the accident, she developed a pimple on her left
breast in the armpit. This was observed at the end of Novem-
ber, 1946. In March of 1950, the pimple became as hard and
big as a nut. A breast cancer was diagnosed and the breast was
removed. The only witness called was an expert. None of the
treating physicians were produced.
The facts, in my opinion, are relatively unimportant. The
important thing concerning this case is a statement by Mr.
Justice Peck. He states in substance that it is not the duty of
the Court to resolve the question as to whether or not trauma
could produce cancer of the breast. He does, however, state:
Even in such medical opinion as would recognize the pos-
sibility of trauma leading to cancer, certain Postulates must
be satisfied before a connection can be considered estab-
lished. Two of such Postulates are pertinent to the pres-
ent case; the cancer must develop exactly at the site of the
injury and the cancer must not develop until there has
been a sufficient time interval after the injury for it to de-
velop and reach a detectable size.
12
10 Ewing, op. cit. supra n. 5. Mock and Ellis had previously set up similar
postulates. See, Mock & Ellis, Trauma and Malignancy, 86 J. A. M. A. 257
(1926).
11 279 App. Div. 494, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 811 (1952).
12 Id. at 813.
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The court then continues, and says that these facts are "incon-
sistent with the Postulates."
Later, the court went even further and stated:
Plaintiff should be expected in that event, to have doctors
who observed and treated plaintiff's wife after her acci-
dent, give such testimony as they might be able and quali-
fied to give as to whether the injuries they observed could
have caused the cancer in the location in which it de-
veloped. The surgeon who performed the breast operation
should be called for such relevant testimony as he might
give, and one or more recognized authorities on breast can-
cer should be called. 13
Judge Shientag, while he concurred, disagreed in part with
Judge Peck. He stated that he was not prepared to formulate
requirements which must be satisfied before a connection can
be considered to have been established between a trauma and a
cancerous growth.
This decision is an amazing and revolutionary one. No
court has, to my knowledge, ever incorporated in a judicial de-
cision medical postulates which must be proven before a case
can be established. In the average case, a general practitioner
has the right to make a statement with reasonable certainty as
to either an orthopedic injury, injury to the brain, or injury
to any other part of the human body. No matter how eminent
the medical gentlemen who are produced against him, this still
does not deprive the litigant of the right to have a jury pass
upon his or her case. Of course, the jury then has the right to
determine which testimony it will give greater credence. We
now have, however, incorporated into the law on the subject
of trauma and cancer, definite medical minimal requirements.
In the case of Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp.,14 Judge Peck
again rendered an opinion concerning this most vital subject.
This dealt with the aggravation of a previous condition where
the plaintiff testified he first noticed the lump about the size of
a pea on his right breast about a week after the accident,
and within a few months a lump the size of a walnut, diagnosed
as cancer, and requiring radical breast surgery. The blow in
this case was concededly an indirect one. A pathologist and a
13 Id. at 814 (italics added).
14 282 App. Div. 193, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 64 (1953), afl'd, 306 N. Y. 917, 119 N. E.
2d 601 (1954).
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radiologist testified to aggravation and acceleration. They stated
that the transmission of force to the breast region, by a fall on
the back, was sufficient to satisfy the Postulate. Experts called
by the defendant denied it.
The court stated:
In the absence of a direct blow to the site of the cancer or
spreading into surrounding areas, there is no adequate basis
for believing that the growth of the cancer was in any way
affected or accelerated by the plaintiff's fall.15
Again the court took upon itself to enunciate medical prin-
ciples as a matter of law. While the case was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, it does not, however, indicate of necessity that
the Court of Appeals endorsed this doctrine. The plaintiff had
likewise failed to prove a cause of action in negligence in the
opinion of the court.
In the case of James Avesato v. Paul Tishman Co.,16 Mr.
Justice Spector was of the following opinion:
Plaintiff testified that the nipple of his left breast was
knocked off and suspended by surrounding skin. Four
months later, he was operated on for the removal of a tumor
of the left breast. It was claimed originally that trauma was
the cause of the carcinoma, but upon the trial the claim was
changed to aggravation. Experts were called on both sides
of the case. The defendant's experts claimed that it is unrea-
sonable to assume that a cancer is ever dormant; that a
claim of aggravation is nothing but speculation; that trauma
does not affect unfavorably a cancer.
17
The court states:
There was considerable discussion about Ewing's Postulates
and Peck's Postulates in determining casual relationship. It
was explained that even if all the Postulates were satisfied,
it does not establish causation. The criteria was set up to
illuminate all those cases unworthy of consideration . . .
But if all criteria are satisfied, you still do not prove causa-
tion. These are merely screening devices to eliminate un-
meritorious cases.1 8
After quoting from Judge Peck's decision in the Sikora case, 19
15 Id. at 122 N. Y. S. 2d 67.
16 142 N. Y. S. 2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
17 Id. at 763.
18 Id. at 768.
19 Supra n. 15.
May, 1963
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Judge Spector then wisely continues:
If the converse is true, I submit that the court is writing
into law conclusions concerning medical matters on which
the medical profession itself is not agreed.
20
In the opinion of the writer, that is precisely what the higher
courts have done.
I am likewise mindful of the fact that at the present time,
scarification is being resorted to in an attempt to prevent the
metastasis of cancer. Judge Spector comments briefly upon this
and states: "In fact trauma to cancer kills the cells which are
traumatized."
My opinion, for whatever it is worth, is that most of these
cases, particularly where a female claims that she has been
struck by a door and a malignancy has developed, are really
cases of traumatic determinism in which attention is directed by
the very occurrence of the accident, to a condition which already
existed. Yet there are many medical statements and opinions
recently from England in which the learned medical profession
states in language substantially as follows: "One cannot rule out
trauma as a cause of cancer." This, however, is of no avail to
the lawyer. The lawyer should likewise bear in mind the Postu-
lates of Selye; the effect of trauma and the consequent alarm
reaction, its effect on the manufacture of adrenalin, the stimula-
tion of the pituitary and the production of an increased amount
of ACTH, also the fact that the increase of cortisone retards the
formation of connective tissue and thus plays some part in a fail-
ure to restrain the cells.
21
The great difficulty in establishing these cases is the Postu-
late dealing with a prior integrity of the part. Unfortunately,
the physician fails to appreciate the problem of the lawyer and
the proof that he seeks to elicit. The law has wisely stated that
a medical case must be established with reasonable certainty.
Webster's Dictionary defines reasonable as: "fair, just, and ra-
tional." Certainty is defined as: "the fact of being certain or
assured in mind."
Why should the physician be frightened by these terms? In
his practice each year, he makes his diagnosis of hundreds of
thousands of people with reasonable certainty. The fact that he
uses the term "may" or "might" does not change the circum-
20 Supra n. 16 at 769.
21 Knox, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 474.
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stances. When a physician advises a patient and predicts a medi-
cal condition in his own practice, in the great majority of in-
stances he does so with so-called reasonable certainty. The num-
ber of cases in which he frankly admits that he has no opinion
are rare.
Let us examine this term "reasonable certainty" in the light
of our practical experience. When we board an airplane for a
journey, there is always the possibility that it will plummet from
the skies and crash into the earth. We are, however, "reasonably
certain" that we will arrive at our destination safely. When we
board an ocean going liner, there is always the possibility that
it will sink into the inky depths of the sea. Yet, we know from
practical experience that the ship will deposit us safely on shore.
We know that an occurrence similar to the Titanic sinking is
rare.
"Reasonable certainty" in our courts does not mean a state-
ment made with a positiveness of the "Delphic Oracle." "Rea-
sonable Certainty" does not mean a statement comparable to that
of Moses to the Tribe of Israel when he handed down the Ten
Commandments. What then does it mean? It means precisely
what the words convey, "reasonable certainty." If these words
are to be given a tortured meaning, then medicine had no right
to make any diagnosis prior to the days of the x-ray, the arterio-
gram, the electroencephalogram, and the other numerous clin-
ical aids available to medicine today. Yet, we know that compe-
tent diagnoses were and are being made without these aids, and
with reasonable certainty.
I wonder why a physician, therefore, in a proper case can-
not testify that a patient did not have a malignancy prior to the
accident, bearing in mind the rules of "reasonable certainty"
required by the law. I personally bemoan, with due deference,
the decisions of our higher courts. In my opinion, juries can
competently pass on these matters. I am aware of the constant
bewilderment of doctors who cannot understand why lay people
are entrusted with decisions on disputed matters of medicine.
They always regale their friends socially with stories of how
ignorant juries decided matters properly belonging in the medi-
cal field. The answer is simple. Miscarriages of justice on medi-
cal questions result either from the doctor's inability to articu-
late or the lawyer's lack of preparation, familiarity and ability
to develop the inquiry.
May, 1963
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
TRAUMA AND CANCER 215
Despite my personal views, where the proper proof existed
I would try a case for the plaintiff where it was postulated that
a trauma caused either a cancer or its aggravation. In my opin-
ion, it is regrettable that the court saw fit to lay down these
rules. It is not a lawyer's duty to decide these complicated ques-
tions of medicine.
If my belief or the belief of any other lawyer is to determine
justice, let us close our courtrooms and let every lawyer be an
arbiter on the justice or injustice of a cause. This, of course,
would be a deplorable situation.
Great progress can be made towards an eventual solution of
this most perplexing question, if the physician will appear more
frequently in the courtroom, rather than in the Academic Halls
of Medicine, and state his sincere beliefs with reasonable cer-
tainty, as to whether or not a trauma can cause or aggravate
malignancy.
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